S. 12 & Preamble—Jurisdiction, determination of—Essentials—While determining jurisdiction it would be necessary to examine that the ingredients of the alleged occurrence have nexus with the object of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for determining whether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design or purpose behind the same has to be seen—In case of any doubt with regard to the meaning of any particular provision, the Preamble of the Act may be considered to arrive at the proper conclusion—Preamble of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, clearly manifests that the same has been promulgated to control the acts of terrorism, sectarian violence and other heinous offences as defined in S.6 of the said Act.
Preamble & S.32—Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (XXII of 2000), Preamble & S.14—
Distinguishing features of the two enactments—Under. Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, courts acquire jurisdiction if the offence is triable by them, whereas under Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, courts acquire jurisdiction if offenders are juvenile, irrespective of the nature of offence committed by them–Provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, under its S.32 have the overriding effect over all other laws including the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, whereas under S.14 of said Ordinance its provisions shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force.
Preamble—Law did not make any distinction in the matter of appreciation of evidence in a case under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or under normal criminal law—Credibility of witnesses had to be measured with the same yardstick, whether it was an ordinary crime or a crime striking terror in society—Law did not make any distinction either in leading of evidence in its assessment—Rule was one and the same, that was intrinsic worth of testimony and the fact, that it stood the test of cross-examination—Contradictory versions of the prosecution witnesses made before Anti-Terrorism Court and then before court of ordinary jurisdiction, would shake the entire foundation of the prosecution case—By no stretch of imagination, it was possible to reconcile the conflicting statements of the same prosecution witnesses regarding the same event—Said contradiction would sufficiently furnish a clue to veracity of the testimony of those witnesses, and shake their trustworthiness.
—S. 7(e)—Appreciation of evidence—Abductee had rightly picked up all the three accused in the identification parade and had also identified them in the Court—Demand of ransom by the accused and payment of Rupees four Ins to them as such according to their instructions had been proved on record—Offence under S.7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, being non-compoundable , any compromise between the parties was of no consequence—Accused had not led any evidence to establish their friendship with the abductee or regarding the complicity of the abductee himself in the crime—Entire ransom amount had been recovered from accused who were arrested by the police from the house on the pointation of abductee—Abductee had no motive for false implication of accused in the case—Incriminating recoveries from the accused including the ransom amount, pistols with live cartridges, mobile phone and motorcycle of abductee, had further connected the accused with the offence—Investigating Officer in the peculiar circumstances of the case could not possibly join persons from the public in recovery proceedings, even otherwise police, witnesses were as good witnesses as other witnesses—Recoveries had corroborated the evidence furnished by the prosecution witnesses—Even if the recoveries had not been proved in a case of kidnapping or abduction for ransom, the determining factor was the object behind the crime—Conviction and sentence of accused were upheld in circumstances.
2014 PLD 644 MUHAMMAD YOUSAF v State
Preamble, Third Sched., Ss.1, 6, 7, 23 & 34—Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199—Constitutional petition—Transfer of case from Anti- Terrorism Court to regular court—Scope of S.23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997––
Anti– Terrorism Court dismissed applications of accused involved in different offences namely murder by firing, acid throwing and injury caused by firing in mosque, for transfer of their cases to regular courts—Validity—Purpose of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was to prevent terrorism, sectarian violence and conducting speedy trial of heinous offences—In order to decide whether an offence was triable under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or not, the courts had to see whether the act had tendency to create sense of fear and insecurity in the mind of people or a section of society—Such act might not necessarily have taken place within the view of general public—
Schedule annexed to a statute was as important as the statute itself—Schedule could be used to construe the provisions of the body of the Act—Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had to be given its due importance and, first three paragraphs of the same were general in nature while the fourth paragraph specifically described offences—In order to bring an offence within ambit of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court, nexus of such offence with S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was a pre-requisite—
Paragraph 4 of the Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 categorically mentioned the offences which would be tried only by the Anti-Terrorism Court—Offences in question were within the purview/ambit of the paragraph 4 of the Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and were triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court—Petitions were dismissed.
S. 345— Penal Code (XLV of 1860),Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, 148, 149 & 337-F(iii)—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6(m) & 7(a), (c) & (h)
—Constitution of Pakistan, Art.188—Review of Supreme Court judgment—Murder of police official while on duty—………………..—Regarding first count of death sentence under S.302(b), P.P.C, accused entered into a compromise with legal heirs of deceased and compensation had also been paid, but second count of death under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had its own implications and was not compoundable under Ss.354(5) & (7), Cr.P.C—Compromise between parties was accepted (only) to the extent of conviction under S.302(b), P.P.C and accused was acquitted of said charge—Regarding death sentence under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, quantum of said sentence could be examined in the present case due to its peculiar facts—Sentence of death awarded to accused under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was converted into life imprisonment without extending benefit of S.382-B, P.P.C, as the same was not allowed by Trial Court, High Court and the Supreme Court—Review petition was disposed of accordingly.
S. 497(2)— Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss 324, 34, 337-A(ii), 337-F(ii) & 337-D—Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention, shajjah-i-mudihah, ghayr-jaifah-badiah, jaifah—Bail, grant of—Further inquiry—Case of cross-version FIRs—During the occurrence two persons from accused side also sustained injuries but those injuries had not been disclosed in the FIR—Cross version FIR in such regard was also recorded and challan in both cases i.e. FIR and cross version had been submitted—In such circumstances, it was for the Trial Court to determine as to who was the aggressor and who was aggressed upon, after recording evidence of the parties—Case against the accused persons called for further enquiry falling within the ambit of S. 497(2), Cr.P.C .—Accused persons were granted bail.
S. 9(c)—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342—Possession of narcotic—Reappraisal of evidence—Statement of accused recorded under S. 342, Cr.P.C .—At the time of recording the accused’s statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C . the positive report of the Forensic Science Laboratory had not been put to him at all—If a piece of evidence or a circumstance was not put to an accused person at the time of recording his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C .. then the same could not be considered against him for the purpose of recording his conviction—Appeal was allowed and accused was acquitted of the charge.
Before Ahmed Ali M. Shaikh, C.J. and Mohammed Karim Khan Agha, J
SHARJEEL INAM MEMON and others—Petitioners
NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU through Chairman, Karachi
S. 497(1), First Proviso—Bail—Medical grounds—Principles—Bail on medical grounds can be granted under first proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C. at discretion of court based on particular facts and circumstances of each case:
Following are the principles when bail can be granted on medical grounds:
(a) Sickness or ailment with which accused is suffering is such that it cannot be properly treated within premises of jail and;
(b) some specialized treatment is needed;
(c) continued detention of accused in jail is likely to affect his capacity or is hazardous to his life.
Ss. 498, 155, 173, 177 & 190—-Penal Code (XLV of 1860),
Ss. 467, 468, 471, 420 & 409—Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5
Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act (III of 2006)—Bail before arrest, refusal of—Accused was alleged to have an electricity connection installed in connivance with the WAPDA officials on the basis of bogus ownership documents—Accused filed an application to the Special Judge (Central) for anticipatory bail on the ground that the complainant had no nexus with the plot in dispute—Special Judge (Central), while allowing the application, observed that the case was triable by an ordinary court and therefore ordered the Investigating Officer to delete the offence under S. 409, P.P.C. and S. 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947—Question before the High Court was whether the Special Judge (Central) had the jurisdiction to consider the point of its jurisdiction to entertain pre-arrest bail application at the stage when it was going to decide the same—Court could take cognizance of a case at any stage, including the stage when the bail application was under consideration of the court—Material available before the Special Judge (Central), when it had proceeded to decide the bail, was to be seen—Investigating Agency, at that stage, was still busy in sorting out the true facts of the case and had not opined that the offence was not triable by the Special Judge or the offences were not made out—Prosecution having no evidence to make such an opinion, at bail stage, the court could not take cognizance of the case—Court below had found that the offence under S. 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and S. 409, P.P.C. were not made out, which observation had been given in ignorance of the fact that the Investigating Officer had found the Sub-Divisional Officer and Line Superintendent of WAPDA having been involved in granting electricity connection at the premises of the accused; even otherwise, said finding of the court amounted to decision of the whole case, at the stage when no challan was before it—Sufficient material was available with the prosecution to bring its case within the jurisdiction of Special Judge (Central)—Special Court had no jurisdiction to order for deletion or addition of offence and sending the aggrieved person to the ordinary court, unless and until final report under S. 173, Cr.P.C had been submitted in the court—Court had been vested with the powers to order deletion or addition of the offence, at the stage when it framed charge against the persons concerned and not before that—Prosecution agency, under Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2006, enjoyed the powers to delete or add the offence, according to the facts and evidence collected by the agency, before submitting the report under S. 173, Cr.P.C to the court—Impugned order of the court below was, therefore, not sustainable in the eye of law—High Court, declaring the impugned order as having no legal consequence, held that court might exercise such jurisdiction when final report was submitted before it and when it proceeded to frame the charge against the culprit—Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.